Matt Johnson at GGW has a short post with a wonderful video documenting the logistical process of delivering a new dual-mode Bombardier locomotive to NJ Transit after manufacture in Germany. The video raises several interesting issues:
Logistics – the ALP-46, being built for North American rails, is too heavy to use existing rails for transport from the manufacturing plant in Kassel to the port in Hamburg. As a result, a coordinated ballet of precise movements is needed to get the locomotive to the dock.
The coordination is fascinating to watch. I’m reminded of some of mammoth’s recent posts on the global logistics supply chain, ranging from the world’s new largest vessel, the shape of infrastructure without architects as exemplified by a rail and container yard in Illinois, and commentary on the concept of the aerotropolis (breaking down the BLDGBLOG interview with Aerotropolis author Greg Lindsay).
The precision involved in moving cargo like this is always fascinating. The connection/competition between seaports and airports (obviously, you’re not going to fly a locomotive like this for delivery) is also interesting, particularly in the vein of the role of just-in-time delivery and potential disruptions of supply chains from Japan’s recent earthquake/tsunami.
Manufacturing – The fact that such a journey for an American commuter railroad locomotive is even necessary is puzzling. The vehicle is manufactured in Germany by Bombardier, a Canadian company. It reminds me of the somewhat perverse consequences of Buy America provisions for US Transit systems, as well as the general lack of investment in transit.
Market Urbanism has commented on the impacts of these types of regulations, citing frequent commenter Alon Levy:
What happened in the 1970s was that the rolling stock market shrank, leaving American transit agencies with just a few US vendors. St. Louis and Pullman were fully protected by Buy American. As such, New York City Transit had no choice but to buy trains from them; the trains turned out to be defective, leading to breach of contract lawsuits that bankrupted both companies. Since then, NYCT has bought from foreign companies, following Buy America to the letter but not to the spirit. The first order after the St. Louis and Pullman disasters was imported from Kobe, as Reagan cut all federal funding, and went without a hitch. Subsequent orders required the vendors to establish US plants, but often only the final assembly is done in the US. In the most recent order, the car shells were made in Brazil.
Buy America does the opposite of leveling the playing field for foreign firms. It favors big players, which can land big contracts and establish US plants. The same is true for the regulatory structure: the various globally unique [Federal Railroad Administration] rules benefit companies that are big enough to be able to modify trains for the American market. Just recently, Caltrain’s request for an FRA waiver involved consultation with just the largest companies in the industry. There are a lot of smaller manufacturers that are shut out of the US market; they don’t have the capital to establish new overseas factories or pay lobbyists to write rules in their favor. Those include Switzerland’s Stadler, Spain’s CAF, the Czech Republic’s Skoda, all Chinese firms, and all Japanese firms other than Kawasaki. Those can occasionally land a US contract, but are usually unable to compete with Kawasaki, Alstom, Siemens, and Bombardier, whose US market shares far exceed their global market shares.
Transportation – As noted in the video, these locomotives are far too heavy to travel on German rails. The fact that they can do so on American rails is a testament to the strength of our robust freight network, but it is also indicative of the unnecessary ‘tank’ mentality of US rail vehicles. This kind of excessive weight (and the regulatory perspective that requires it) is biased towards heavy freight and detrimental to passenger rail of all kinds in the United States.